ENVIROMENTAL DATA & GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE

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Transcript of an Interview
Conducted by
Christopher Sellers

(With Subsequent Corrections and Additions)

INTERVIEWEE: Robert Wayland
INTERVIEWER: Christopher Sellers
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<T: 5 min>

INTERVIEWER: All right. So let's hop into the interview. The first set of questions is kind of background, just to give us a sense of where you're coming from and what your overall sort of trajectory into and through the agency has been, so could you tell me your age, your racial ethnic identification, and your gender?

INTERVIEWEE: I'm a 69-year-old Caucasian male.

INTERVIEWER: And tell me about your formal education and the profession that you went into early on. Just if you can give some dates too to give us parameters.

INTERVIEWEE: Well, yes. I graduated from George Washington University with a BA in international business in 1972. And I completed a graduate-level certificate course at the University of Southern California in environmental management in 1977.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. And what prior jobs did you go to before EPA?

INTERVIEWEE: I worked for Senator George Murphy of California part time while I was enrolled at GW [George Washington University], and then I worked for him full time in 1970 for approximately a year. He was defeated when he ran for re-election, and, following that, I went to the National Transportation Safety Board, where I worked for two years as a special assistant to the general manager.

And I resigned that position to take a job as legislative assistant to Congressman Charles Teague of California, who, unfortunately, died in office, and, yeah, I had been communicating with people at EPA— I was writing an environmental newsletter for the congressman— and, after he passed away, one of the principal contacts I had at EPA basically offered me a job at the agency, in its congressional affairs office. So I began at the agency in 1974, and I worked in the congressional affair office until about 1981. And, at that point, Ronald Reagan had become president, Anne Burford [Anne Gorsuch Burford] became administrator of EPA. I felt I would be uncomfortable representing her views on the hill, and so I cast around for another job at the agency.

I went to the office of enforcement's newly-established policy office and I stayed there for about a year and a half, and that was a very tumultuous time at EPA. There was a lot of turmoil in the enforcement office. The political appointee who directed it resigned because there had been a great deal of scrutiny of declining enforcement activity at EPA.

And I left that office and went to the office which had been recently established to implement the Superfund law, so that was the Office of Emergency and Remedial Response. Now that was also the office of solid
waste in emergency response because we also had implementation of RCRA within the office.\(^1\) That assistant administrator was Rita Lavelle.\(^2\) She perjured herself before Congress was – of course, resigned from the agency before she went to trial, but she was replaced by Lee M. Thomas, who was an official at FEMA. And, after Anne Burford resigned from the agency and Bill Ruckelshaus came back to be administrator, he designated – I mean, basically, recommended to Reagan that he appoint Lee Thomas administrator of EPA, which happened. When that occurred, I became the special assistant to the administrator, which I did for about two years. I was selected into the agency's senior executive service candidate program. And, in that capacity, I went to the regional office in Philadelphia, on a rotational assignment. Then to the position of acting deputy assistant administrator for policy.

\(<T: 10\ \text{min}>\)

I subsequently was selected to be the deputy assistant administrator for policy. I was in that job until Bill Reilly was appointed administrator. His incoming assistant administrator for policy had in mind somebody else, a colleague of his, for the deputy assistant administrator job, so I moved to the office of water, and I was the deputy assistant administrator there from – I guess that was 1989 to '91, somewhere in that range. And, after I was deputy assistant administrator for water, I helped encourage a re-organization of the office, which created a new entity called the Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, and I became its first director, and I remained in that position until I retired from EPA in 2003.

**INTERVIEWER:** Okay. Could you, at some point, just send me a CV so I can get – I'm sure there's a lot more detail there too, but, yes, we have a lot to talk about, I would say. All right. So you –

**INTERVIEWEE:** Yeah, I basically ended up changing jobs three times as a consequence of transitions, or maybe you could say four. After I left congressional affairs, the two jobs I moved into I did specifically because of the arrival of Anne Burford and her team. And then, when Lee Thomas became administrator, that was a transition within one presidential administration. I changed jobs to become his special assistant. Then, when I left the deputy assistant administrator for policy job, that was because of a change in administrator, which led to a change in assistant administrators. That's when I moved from policy to water. So I had a lot of direct career changes, as a consequence of transitions,

\(^1\) The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is the public law that creates the framework for the proper management of hazardous and non-hazardous solid waste.

\(^2\) President Ronald Reagan appointed Rita M. Lavelle on February 18, 1982, as assistant administrator of the U.S. EPA for solid waste and emergency response. She was indicted in 1984 for perjury.
which I think is quite unusual. That was not typical for most EPA employees, but most of my career was spent in jobs in which I reported directly to a presidential appointee, so I was always right at the nexus of the career and political staff.

INTERVIEWER: So you were always, throughout this, you were the career person that was sort of right next to the political appointee?

INTERVIEWEE: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. Huh. Okay, that's great. Yeah, it is a unique perspective, I think, and too it was in terms of the continuity too. All right. Let's see. Let me just jump — okay, so let's jump back to the starting point, and I wanted to get a sense of what your early expectations were going into the agency. I mean, we're talking, I guess, 1974. That's really early on in the creation of the agency, but what were your expectations and sort of hopes for moving there?

INTERVIEWEE: Well, I mean, first and foremost, I was looking for a little bit of career stability after my two congressional employers departed—well, certainly, in one case, very unexpectedly and kind of unexpectedly in the other case. But I was also really interested in the environment and excited about EPA because it was a new agency. I thought there would be lots of opportunities to be involved in interesting things.

I may have mentioned that the congressional district for Congressman Teague included Santa Barbara, California, where the oil blowout occurred, so that, along with Silent Spring and a couple of other events, was really a starting point for the environmental movement and a catalyst for creating EPA. So I was very interested in the environment.

I actually don't remember reading Silent Spring at the time it was issued, but one of the first non-fiction books I read as a youngster was Rachel Carson's The Sea Around Us, which I was quite fascinated by. I never had the math skills to be proficient in any of the sciences, but I was always interested in the natural world. And I had been a camper at a sailing camp in North Carolina at about age 10 to about age 16, and so I loved being on the water, I love sailing, and so I was—particularly the blowout engendered in me a strong feeling about the need to protect the aquatic environment. So I thought I could realize that at EPA.

INTERVIEWER: Where did you grow up? Just parenthetically.

INTERVIEWEE: My dad was in the Air Force, and so we traveled around quite a bit. I lived in Hawaii and Japan. Lived in London, England, when I was a senior in high school. But, mostly, except for Montgomery, Alabama, for a year, during the year that George Wallace was standing in the schoolhouse door, which was kind of uncomfortable for me, we mostly lived in the D.C. suburbs because most of his assignments were at the Pentagon or at the headquarters of his military organization, so. So I lived in Hershey, Pennsylvania for two years, which was my only kind of small-town America experience. But mostly the D.C. suburbs.

INTERVIEWER: So you walked into the agency, what – in 1974, I guess, was your first position. And what – you said congressional affairs office? Could you just describe a little bit more what you did there?
INTERVIEWEE: Sure. Well, that's the interface between the executive agency and Congress, typically staffed by people who worked on the hill because they understand what congressional offices want from an agency. So I did everything from helping get responses to congressional letters to preparing witnesses for testimony. Briefing members of Congress and primarily congressional staff on major actions that the agency was taking that we knew they would be interested in. And I had a beat. Initially, my beat was the water program, the Clean Water Act. The water act had been passed in 1972, so EPA was still, in 1974, undertaking a lot of major policy decisions and issuing regulations. We would typically arrange a briefing for the House and Senate staffs of the authorizing committees who worked on the Clean Water Act, to tell them what we were doing.

And I would accompany the administrator or deputy administrator to meetings with members of Congress; they always brought somebody along from congressional affairs. My first week on the office, I went with – in the office, I went with John Quarles, the deputy administrator, to some meeting – I don’t remember who the member of Congress was – but we got up there; he wanted to use the bathroom. We were in the office building I had worked in immediately before. He said, “Yeah, I need to find a head,” so I, yeah, immediately took him right to where the bathroom was. He said, “Yeah, you passed your first test,” so [chuckles].

But I really enjoyed the work there. There was a lot of variety to it; it was somewhat familiar. And, when the agency – the administrator cancelled DDT shortly before I arrived at EPA, and then there began a whole series of additional actions to suspend, which is the kind of emergency procedure, like a TRO or cancel action, to eliminate some uses of a pesticide. We were going after a lot of the “chemical cousins” to DDT, and the committee which oversaw that work, the committee which had passed the Federal Pesticide Control Act of 1972, was the agriculture committee, the agricultural committee and the House and Senate. So they, of course, were pretty farmer-friendly and were pretty upset that the agency was taking away these widely-used insecticides, primarily, that were seen as—indispensable to production and control of insects and other pests in production agriculture, so that was not making them happy.

So we had – they started to hold a series of very disapproving oversight hearings to beat us around, and I got shifted over to the pesticide beat when that happened. And I worked on, really, primarily, on pesticides for the rest of my time in the congressional affairs office. There was an effort to remove EPA's authority to cancel pesticides or, actually, to require the secretary of agriculture's concurrence on any of those actions, which we fought off, which we did in 1976, I guess. And then industry was tying up the regulatory process with lots of lawsuits over the ownership and –

<T: 20 min>
use of the safety testing data they conducted and submitted to the agency to support their registrations. And they wanted to basically have a perpetual period of exclusive use of that data to support their registrations, so, in effect, they’d have a never-ending patent. And they didn’t want EPA to disclose the information to the public. We thought the public needed to know what the underlying health and safety studies showed, as a matter of appropriate public information. So we saw ourselves being tied up in this litigation, and so we proposed amendments to try to resolve that, and we were ultimately successful in 1978 in getting those amendments enacted by the House and Senate. And, during that period, I was able to assume a more important and somewhat unusual role.

The tradition of the agriculture committees, when they had a business meeting to mark-up legislation, was to invite representatives of the department of agriculture to sit at the table with the committee staff to answer their questions and explain provisions of the legislation that were being marked up. Well, they actually extended that privilege to EPA and, initially, the director of the pesticides office was the person sitting with the staff. And then, later, I fulfilled that role, at least traded off with him. And then, ultimately, when the House and Senate bills went to a conference committee to reconcile the differences, I was the agency’s primary spokesman to respond to questions about, “Well, what if we made this change in the law? What if we made that change in the law?” So I really loved that and I didn’t want to leave it when Reagan was elected and Anne Burford was appointed, but I just knew I was not going to feel comfortable.

The people that she brought into the congressional affairs office, initially, were pretty — well, they were naturally suspicious. I mean, it was an office that was pretty “small-p” political in nature, and I think they viewed somebody who’d been there during the previous Democratic administration with a certain amount of suspicion, although I did make sure they were aware that I had worked for a Republican senator and a Republican congressman. And I did get some congressional staff people who worked for Republicans, particularly on the agriculture committee, to send them notes or let them know that I was a straight-shooter; I wasn’t somebody who set out to screw the Republicans, to the advantage of the Democrats. So they ultimately decided I was okay — I could have stayed around, but I didn’t want to, and so I went off on this job search.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, yeah. Well, let me just try this question on you. I mean, it’s clear that you’re involved in the political side. If there is a political side, this is probably the most politically sort of connected side of what the EPA does, in congressional affairs.

INTERVIEWEE: Mm-hmm.

INTERVIEWER: But our question — we’re trying to get a sort of — we try to ask everybody the same set of questions, so the question is this, about your sense, at that time, of political influence on the agency and what it did. And particularly in terms of putting it in perspective with other periods and so on, what would you say?
INTERVIEWEE: Well, I mean, members of both political parties, regardless of who the
president is, want to influence the agency, and I would say that did not really
have a partisan flavor, for the most part, in my involvement.

I mean, the one thing that was a practice to the agency that also happened
outside of the congressional affairs office, which was kind of overtly partisan,
was we would get information on grants before they were publicly
announced. And we would provide that information to members of Congress
so that they could announce that EPA was going to make a grant in their
state or in their congressional district for some activity. And we would give the
members of the president's party the first knowledge of that, so they had the
first shot at getting out a press release saying, “I'm Daniel Moynihan and New
York is getting a grant from EPA for this amount,” and Jacob Javits, who was
the Republican, wouldn't have a chance to – he wouldn't get that lead on that.

So that was a small thing that I think it was probably a universal practice in
the executive branch, to let the members of your party have information on
grants. We would also give congressional offices heads-up on major actions
we were taking. We probably gave the president's party members the first
calls, but that was usually – there wasn't really a partisan advantage to those
particularly and we got the information to everybody and often
simultaneously.

The one example that I can think of — and it's really one of very few in my
whole career, including all the other jobs I was in at EPA, of a very clearly
political, partisan political, decision — involved actions that EPA was taking,
under the pesticides law, manufacturers have to put a label on the pesticide.
EPA approves what goes on the label. It includes some standard boilerplate
about safety precautions if you expose yourself to the pesticide and so forth.
And some of these labels were not entirely clear, in some respects, so we
were developing a series of things called — our enforcement office called
“pesticide enforcement policy statements.” There would be a statement on
the label, saying, “Do not allow to drift,” and we became aware that aerial
application of pesticides was happening close to schools, hospitals, and
homes, and they would — they want the product on the crop, so they wouldn't
necessarily spray at a high wind, but they could spray in conditions where
spray drift would come to a school or a hospital or a subdivision.

And there'd been a big outcry about that, so we developed a pesticide
enforcement policy statement on aerial application, which was much more
specific, about — it wasn't actually a change to the registration, but it was how
we were going to interpret that broad phrase, “Don’t allow to drift.” And we
were saying we would exercise our enforcement discretion not to take action
if you followed these recommendations.

And that became quite controversial. And Senator John Culver was a
Democrat from, I want to say, Iowa, and he was in a very tight election race,
and his opponent was blaming EPA and blaming him, as a Democratic
member by extension, during the — this must have been during the Carter
administration, for these pesticide enforcement policy statements. So he or
somebody from his staff called either the White House or called the assistant
administrator for pesticides and toxic substances and said, “You've got to kill

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those pesticide enforcement policy statements.” And the assistant administrator agreed to do that, and told me about it because I was—although I wasn't really in a line program office, I was pretty influential about that particular matter, and so he told me about it. And I was pretty unhappy about it, and he made some comment about “I see you don't, you don't take losing well,” or something like that. But, I mean, that was one of very few instances I can think of where there was a policy decision of the agency that was affected by somebody's congressional race, and I think that was very unusual.

But members of Congress sought to influence the agency's decisions all the time, but they would generally— they would make some kind of argument on the merits; they wouldn't say, “Look, I'm John Breaux from Louisiana. You owe me this.” I would say another time—and it does involve John Breaux—that was kind of interesting. Much later in my career—in fact, I was the director for the office of wetlands, oceans, and watersheds, and the wetlands program at EPA had become quite controversial, and there was this, this was in the Contract with America days, and the property rights movement had gotten very kind of big and noisy and militant and demanding. And, at the time, EPA was looking for cabinet status, which was very early in the Clinton administration. They were testing the water with different members about supporting cabinet status.

And John Breaux, Democrat from Louisiana, said to the White House people that were talking to him, “This is gonna be really hard to do unless you can clamp down some of the unhappiness about the wetlands program at EPA.” So we basically agreed to, the administration agreed to establish a White House-chaired wetlands working group, to develop a series of recommendations that intended to make the implementation of the different agency programs fair, flexible, and effective. And it actually, I think, was just as good on the effectiveness side as it was on the fair and flexible side, but it was an attempt to reduce some of the tension about that program. And that happened because a senator from the president's party said, “I think—” Louisiana was a hotbed of this opposition. And he said, “You know, I think you need to get these controversies simmered down or it's going to be an obstacle to passing the cabinet status legislation.” Ultimately, that legislation didn't pass, but it wasn't because of wetlands; it was for other reasons.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Interesting that these are both—both of your examples are in Democratic administrations. Is that...


INTERVIEWER: Okay. So you know for—okay. That's interesting.

3 John Berlinger Breaux was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives for Louisiana from 1972 to 1987, and a Louisiana Senator from 1987 to 2005.
INTERVIEWEE: Yeah, those were both things that I was very much involved in personally and that's why they stand out in my memory and there could have been—you know, there may have been as many or more in Republican administrations. I just don't, you know, sort of remember it that way.

INTERVIEWER: But you were in the place where you saw those happening and so. Great. Okay. Very interesting.

What about – the other sort of main thrust of the questions that we ask everybody has to do with the role of science, and let's go back to the – I guess it's mostly the Carter administration, in terms of your work in the congressional affairs office. It sounds like there might be some ways that you interacted with any scientists or sort of the scientific sort of reports within the agency. Tell me a little bit about how that worked in that particular time, in that job.

INTERVIEWEE: Sure. Sure. Well, and this is – I think this is kind of interesting. As I mentioned at the outset that pesticide program was pretty controversial with farmers and the department of agriculture and agriculture interests. And, interestingly enough, the lawyers at EPA, working with scientists, developed a set of, more or less, informal cancer guidelines, and I think there were nine principles. What they were hoping to do— and they, in fact, did do— these pesticide cancellation and suspension proceedings were adjudicatory hearings, like a trial, in front of the administrative law judge, who made a recommendation that the administrator could then adopt or modify. And many of these—DDT was not actually cancelled because of carcinogenic considerations; it was more its wildlife effects, its bird effects. But several of its other chemical relatives – heptachlor, chlordane, Mirex —I'm blanking on a couple of the others, but there were five or six of them. The principal concern was the potential to cause cancer in humans as shown by animal tests. And so the lawyers who were presenting these cases to the administrative law judges were trying to propound a series of principles that, once they were adopted and taken as sound principles in one case, in the next case, they could just cite that as a precedent and say, “Well, as ALJ so-and-so and administrator so-and-so found in the heptachlor, chlordane case, it's reasonable to extrapolate from mice to men,” that kind of thing.

Those cancer guidelines were pretty controversial; they were developed as a collaboration between scientists at EPA and the lawyers, but the National Agricultural Chemicals Association was really upset about them and, probably, this Chemical Manufacturers Association and others. So I mentioned this legislation to keep EPA from taking something off the market unless the agriculture secretary agreed, and I didn't formulate this, but part of the agency’s counterstrategy to that was to say, “Look, we'll set up an independent scientific advisory panel, and they will have a, they'll be able to develop an independent position on suspensions before they take effect, and we'll also run major policy issues past them.” And so we proposed the scientific advisory panel.

A group of three senior agency officials who were not in the pesticides program was convened to formulate these recommendations, and so one of them was a scientific advisory panel, another was that the administrator
would appoint an agricultural advisor who would talk directly to him about the gamut of agricultural issues, not just pesticide issues. And there's a third piece which I'm not remembering right now.

But, part of how we succeeded in fighting off the legislation to give the agriculture secretary a veto was by acquiescing in the enactment of an amendment that required us to have the scientific advisory panel we already said we were going to set up, so that was done. And that was done for "small-p" political reasons because there were Democrats as well as Republicans at that time who wanted to curtail EPA's authority. So that was a science issue that was addressed in a political-slash-policy way, but the agency was, at that time, just sort of dealing with what was the controversy for quite a long time, at OSHA, at FDA, and at EPA, about the role of animal testing, particularly in predicting cancer and being a consideration in regulatory decisions.

And we had a, I think we had a, there was a little cancer effects group in, I think, in the office of research and development. It was headed by Dr. Elizabeth Anderson, Betty Anderson – I remember that very well – and that was a kind of case of trying to develop congressional acceptance of evolving scientific principles that EPA was applying.

INTERVIEWER: And this is the science advisory board? The origin of that?

INTERVIEWEE: Well, no. It's actually – the –

INTERVIEWER: Or is that different?

INTERVIEWEE: The SAB came later. This is FIFRA – Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act – scientific advisory panel. And it was in – I don't think we had the SAB at that time. I think the SAB came along later, but there is an SAB, but the SAB opines on a whole variety of policy issues that have a scientific component. I don't think there's a statutory requirement or even, necessarily, a practice of having them review and comment on regulations the way the SAP would review and comment on suspensions and cancellations.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, okay. So that was a separate – I understand SAB had its origins also – I think it was in the Carter administration, but that must be another story. Yeah. But it's interesting to hear this other science advisory panel being set up too. So let's see. What about your sense about how the, in the Carter years, I guess, into the Reagan years, there's a change, but your sense that the work in the agency that you were doing was supported by higher-ups outside the agency, within the agency as well as outside within the administration?

INTERVIEWEE: Well, that certainly wasn't the case during Anne Burford's tenure.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

INTERVIEWEE: I mean, during the first two-and-a-half to three years, however long she was there, the sense was that she didn't believe in EPA's mission. She wanted to curb what she saw as excesses in what EPA was doing. She had very little interaction with the career staff, which was unusual because Ruckelshaus [Bill Ruckelshaus] and Train [Russell E. Train], who preceded her, and Costle [Doug Costle] had had a lot of interaction with the career staff. She kind of sequestered herself with a small group of her assistant administrators and special assistants. She saw, later, that that was not a good — that was not
serving her well, and she began to open up a little bit and have some meetings and included career staff, and so I did attend some meetings with her later in her tenure.

<T: 40 min>

But, when I went to the office of solid waste and emergency response, for example, Rita Lavelle was—she had been, apparently, the attorney general's babysitter, babysitter for Ed Meese's children, and I don't think she had any particular credentials that qualified her to be in charge of solid waste and emergency response at EPA. She was quite young and I think fairly naive and not a bad person, but she exercised bad judgment and, ultimately, she told what she probably thought was a small lie, and I don't even remember what it was, but it was after she had taken an oath, and so it was a easily-proven falsehood, so she paid a high price for that.

But she also brought into her immediate office a toxicologist to be a science advisor, and this guy was clearly outside the mainstream of scientific thinking about toxicology at the time. He was a real eyebrow-raiser. Some of the people, earlier, when I was in the enforcement office, some of the people who were brought in there as—you know, there’re two types of political appointees. There are presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed political appointees, and then there are presidential appointees who aren’t Senate-confirmed, which is what EPA’s regional administrators are, and then there’s a category called “Schedule C,” and those are lower-level political appointees and they don’t get any Senate confirmation, but the White House is involved in their selection, usually. And, in the enforcement office, when I was there, the people who came in were—there was a really weird cast of characters.

The former strength coach for the Denver Broncos, who was, at the time, and times were not as tolerant as they have become, rumored to be gay. A former priest, who we all referred to as the “defrocked priest”—I don't know whether he was actually gotten into trouble with the church or not, but he was no longer a priest. And then this guy with really bad teeth who had worked for the congressman from Youngstown, Ohio, who was under investigation or under indictment for taking bribes and racketeering and so forth, and this guy had been his legislative assistant on the hill. Knew nothing about EPA or environmental programs, but I guess he saw his boss potentially taking a fall, so he wound up there. So there’s very weird cast of characters, none of whom had much qualifying experience and who definitely didn’t seem to be interested in trying to advance EPA’s role as an enforcer of environmental laws. So, certainly, in the Gorsuch era, there were lots of indications that things were not going well.

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4 Edwin Meese III served as Ronald Reagan's second attorney general, and prior Gov. Reagan’s legal secretary, executive assistant, and chief of staff in California.
I will say, however, that, while I was working on the pesticide legislation, my principle contact in the office of pesticide programs is my wife, and we got married after working together closely on that legislation. So our personal history goes back almost to the beginning of my time at EPA. And she worked in the pesticide office. The guy who was selected there as assistant administrator was not a real bad guy. Of course, industry wanted their registrations to be processed. They wanted the seal of approval from the government, so she was pretty insulated from a lot of the stuff that was causing me sleepless nights in my three different jobs during that period in the early Reagan years. So it definitely was different from place to place, in the agency, during that time.

INTERVIEWER: Could you just walk me through the – this is a lot of changes in the early Reagan years, and just if you could walk me through those changes in relation to what was happening with Gorsuch’s appointment, and then the fallout. I'm a little bit unclear, I guess, as to what. So you first went to the office of enforcement, the policy piece of that.

INTERVIEWEE: Right.

INTERVIEWER: Then – and you were there a year-and-a-half? Is that right?

INTERVIEWEE: Yeah, I think it was about that. Maybe it was only a year. The problem there wasn't so much the policies as it was – there was sort of this continuous confusion about roles and responsibilities. This guy that came from Ohio, Bill Sullivan, that I was working for directly, who sort of assumed the assistant administrator's job, I think kind of wanted to – he was an attorney; he knew what the job was. I think he kind of wanted to do the job, but they were – everything – there was a re-organization that was underway and there were lots of discussions about moving people, reassigning people to different areas, and, of course, there was still a Democratic-controlled Congress, and they took a lot of interest in the fact that EPA wasn't filing as many enforcement cases as it had. And so that started to become a focal point of criticism against the agency, and this guy, Bill Sullivan, basically was the one who had to commit ritual hari-kari and try to take the fall for Anne.

And so he resigned, but I think he resigned because Anne Burford said, “Well, I gotta make a change in that office 'cause there's just too much heat.” And then his responsibilities were taken over by the guy who was the general counsel of EPA, who was a very minimally-qualified attorney, who I guess had worked for Exxon in Texas, and he was a very insecure person. He was a very nasty person on a personal level. He had a couple of special assistants who followed him around with little green record books – they say “record” on the front of 'em. These are something that, for a time, were a common bureaucratic fixture. People had these little green books. And he would tell his guys – he'd have a meeting with somebody and he wasn't happy about what they'd said or what they recommended or their—it was often he didn't feel they were sufficiently prepared, and he would turn to one of his special assistants and say, “20 points off his performance evaluation.”

Just constantly saying, “We're gonna get that guy when it's time for performance reviews.”
And he was just really unpleasant to work for. Along with another guy, we tried to prepare him for a congressional hearing and we were in his office from 5:00 PM until 3:00 AM, and he was just getting more confused and frustrated, and he’s sleep-deprived at that point, and he’s—I was not a lawyer; my colleague was a lawyer. And he got off on a tangent about a particular case and what precedent it established, and my colleague who was there with me was also, of course, sleep-deprived and kind of stumbled his way through an answer, and Bob Perry just got furious about it. And I finally said, “The best thing you can do now is just go home and get some sleep before the hearing because this is just not productive anymore. You’re just getting yourself more worked up and it’s not going to help you do a good job tomorrow.”

And he did a terrible job, as was completely foreseeable all the way through. But he was a really nasty guy, and so I was mainly unhappy at that point, not because of policy stuff but because the people I was around were just so unpleasant.

So that’s when I looked for and found the job working for Rita Lavelle, the OSWER assistant administrator, who, as I said, I think was out of her depth and was kind of naive, but she wasn’t personally obnoxious and evil. She was kind of a nice person who appreciated what all of her staff did for her.

So I think there were different kinds of discomfort in that period and different kinds of policy things going on. I think most things in the agency just kind of ground to a halt as a result of incompetence and confusion more than really effectively implementing the changes that Anne Burford seemed to want. I mean, and then this pace of congressional oversight hearings just built and built and built, and there were multiple hearings a week and constant—we would get letters from John Dingell of Michigan who, actually, was very green on a few issues but was the great friend of the auto industry because that was what his district in Michigan was. And he would send these long interrogatories to the agency. I mean, he was ferocious about failure to implement the Superfund law and the hazardous waste law. At the same time, he was very protective of the auto industry.

INTERVIEWER: Wait, the budget cuts that they proposed? You think that that—you haven't mentioned that, but just to put that forward is—

INTERVIEWEE: Yeah. Yeah. Well, I think there were fairly severe cuts proposed, but, again the Democrats were in charge of Congress. They were going to appropriate what they were going to appropriate, and I don't remember us ever. I don't remember us shedding a whole lot of people, and I think that's why there was
an interest in doing things like consolidating all the lawyers in one office and then saying, “Oh, there are too many lawyers, so we’ll have a RIF, a reduction in force, and we’ll get rid of X percent – of the lawyers, and it wouldn’t matter – they’d go out based upon their seniority, not based upon what kind of work they were doing.” So, and maybe they would, you know, well, I’m not sure exactly how it would have worked, in a strict appropriation standpoint, but, I mean, I think there was some — I mean part of that was people voluntarily leaving. I mean, the guy who was in charge in the enforcement of policy office, when I went there, was just so kind of flabbergasted and discomfited by all this zaniness going on, that he found a job outside of the agency, and I ended up replacing him. And then, when I went to OSWER, somebody else replaced me. But I think that more people left because of dissatisfaction, morale, anxiety, than as a result of budget cuts, but I don't really remember that much about what happened in the budget of that time. I mean, I'd been in the agency long enough and in a senior enough capacity that I wasn't expecting to be riffed. And we did have new programs, new offices starting up. I mean, this office of solid waste and emergency response was new – it had to be staffed – so I think it wasn't like we were, that I recall, that we were shedding lots and lots of people. I'm sure that they submitted a budget that was much smaller than the onboard staff, but I don't think that's ever came to pass, unlike now, when I think that very well could come to pass because the house of congress and the executive branch are all in one party. And, obviously, we know what Donald Trump has said about EPA. So, of course, I expect morale is completely in the tank.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. So morale and atmosphere, that seemed to be the biggest impact in the Reagan transition.

INTERVIEWEE: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: What about the role of science and scientists, from your vantage point in these various positions, in the Reagan years?

INTERVIEWEE: You know I think there was controversy. The big sort of controversy, in addition to, “Could you extrapolate animal testing to people to regulate chemicals?” I think the other big thing that was kicking around at the time was acid rain and what to do about acid rain. And I think that there was some acid rain denial, but I wasn't close to that issue. I don't remember there being a lot of controversy. I don't remember a lot of controversy about air quality standards or water quality standards, where you would look at human health or environmental impacts to develop a rule making. And maybe that's because of kind of my shifting from congressional affairs and pesticides, which I knew something about, to enforcement, where I was just kind of learning things and science wasn't a — they were making sure that people abided by the requirements, not setting the standards, so they didn't have a big technical or scientific component. And then, in OSWER, we were taking clean-up – clean-up goals and standards were being borrowed from the other agency programs. If you had a site that was emitting air pollutants that were going to violate an air quality standard, you'd clean it up to the point where the air quality standard was met. You had to have a clean-up target for all these sites, and, usually, it was a drinking water standard 'cause groundwater
contamination was often a part of the problem or a water quality standard because surface water was often contaminated by these sites. So I don't really remember lots of scientific controversy during the Reagan years, but that may have been more a matter of where I was sitting and what I was experiencing than what was otherwise going on.

INTERVIEWER: Could you just clarify what was your work in the enforcement office? I guess I'm. You told me a little bit about the other one, but what were your tasks and so on?

INTERVIEWEE: My initial assignment, which I actually worked on for several months and it was almost kind of my exclusive work for several months – there was a consolidated office of permitting and enforcement at EPA, and, I mean, because it's the permit limits that you enforce. So that office had been charged with developing a study on permit fees to offset the costs of permitting. And I worked on this permit fee study for several months. OMB was trying to – they're big on fees. They were trying to get users to pay for their government services, rather than the taxpayers, so they thought—and actually, in many states, there were fees to implement permits so the prospective permittee was shouldering the costs of the environmental and economic analysis associated with developing their permit. So they wanted that to happen at the federal level, and I was working on a fee to do that. And I think I did that for the first several months, and then, after that, a lot of what was going on—and this was only a five-person policy shop— a lot of what was going on after that was trying to collect information to establish that, yes, we still were doing enforcement, working on these congressional requests for information. Not very much was going on that was actually very productive, at that point.

So, I mean, that's what I did initially, and then I kind of evolved into helping with the congressional stuff because they knew I had that experience. And then I left and went to OSWER and they had a little policy office there, and they really were trying to develop policies on implementation of the new law, and I was trying to serve a coordinating function for that. And there, once again, I got sucked into helping respond to the congressional inquiries and helping prepare Rita Lavelle for her hearings – and, apparently, I left out the important one, which is, “After you take the oath of office, don't lie,” because that's how she got in trouble. But, during that whole period until Lee Thomas became assistant administrator in the Reagan years, I don't think I did very much that was really productive work.

INTERVIEWER: And so – okay, so then there's that third leg in the Reagan years, with where you are working with Lee Thomas.

INTERVIEWEE: Right.

INTERVIEWER: And so tell me about the transition there? I mean, that's a transition within the Reagan administration, but...And, what angle you had on it. And it sounds like you had kind of an inside angle, so tell me a little bit about—

INTERVIEWEE: Right. Well, as we watched the Gorsuch crew of people sort of self-destruct and collapse and all leave, there was a huge feeling of relief in the agency. The general— one of— couple of former employees of the general counsel's
office sent several cases of champagne to the general counsel's office when Bob Perry got the boot, and I remember being at that party for several hours. There's just a really wonderful feeling when Bill Ruckelshaus was announced as the incoming administrator. I had not worked for him—he was gone by the time I got to EPA—but everybody who had remembered him very fondly and we all knew that he was kind of the hero of the Saturday Night Massacre, so people thought, "Wow, this is great. We're gonna get back to doing our jobs and we're gonna have leadership that believes in the agency's mission." And I think the first thing they did was get rid of all the Schedule Cs who had worked for the Burford appointees. And then I don't remember him bringing back many other Schedule C people.

Lee brought in a special assistant who had worked for a Ohio congressman, very sharp young woman who was an attorney and not terribly partisan but she was very good.

<T: 60 min>

She subsequently became his chief of staff, then became assistant administrator for policy, and I was her deputy for a while. Then she became assistant administrator for pesticides and toxic substances under Bill Reilly. So the caliber of the people, the small number of political people who were coming into the agency with Ruckelshaus, was quite good. So it was a really— I mean, that was less like a transition and more like a salvation.

And everybody kind of got back to work and we did our jobs; we made decisions; we were clicking right along. And there were some valuable initiatives. Lee Thomas wanted to take better advantage of technological advances and public-private partnerships, so we set up some initiatives there. He initiated a—the wetlands program had become controversial then already, and it was sort of born with controversy, and he commissioned a public dialogue with governors, representatives of the agriculture community, home builders. It was called "the national wetlands policy forum," and it made recommendations about how to improve wetland protection and reduce some of the friction in the program. And it made a number of recommendations which were implemented, including establishing a wetlands office, which Lee Thomas did. So we did—there were some definite forward movement in areas where the agency had been struggling or hadn't made a lot of progress. He was a wonderful administrator, really well liked. He was committed to making decisions in a very open way. There would be a meeting on an important policy matter where there might be differing opinions within the agency. We have a meeting in the large conference room near the administrator's office and there'd be 40 people jammed into the conference room, including relatively young staff people from a regional office, who were involved with the issue. So he wasn't real rank-conscious. He was very comfortable hearing perspectives from career staff. So it was a real high point in the agency's history, I think.
Ruckelshaus had done some of that as well, but I think Lee even more so kind of opened up the decision-making process. And he would often have one of those big meetings, hear lots of input, and arrive at the outlines of a decision in the meeting, which he would explain. And then the finer points, he'd repair to his office with his special assistant handling that area, and I was handling air and water for a while, and say, “Well, I think we should do this,” and, “Look at this part for me and give me a couple of options on that.” And then we'd come back with a decision memo, explaining what he decided to do about what, at the time, was being called “the air bubble policy,” where you put a bubble over the facility and look at all of its different emission sources and allow the facility some flexibility in where they would put controls in place. So that was a very smooth, very easy transition. Of course, the assistant administrators turned over—all the Burford ones left; new ones arrived.

Lee Thomas once said that was one of the most challenging or frustrating parts of his job because the White House did have a major voice in who was going to get those jobs. They would sort of send him a list that he could pick from, and it wasn't always a list of superstars, and so — but, generally, the people who came were good at their jobs, they had qualifications, and they were capable. The ones I worked with were good, so that was a very easy transition. I'm answering you at great length, and I promised I'd be at another meeting at 11:00, so we may –

INTERVIEWER: Okay. So we have to – yeah, I get it.

INTERVIEWEE: I have to shorten up. [Chuckles] I mean, I have to be less loquacious.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. No, this is great. This is great. These stories, I mean, that's the meat right there. And so just let me—in terms of your working with Lee Thomas, that was into the first Bush administration or was that...

INTERVIEWEE: Yeah, he left and Bill Reilly—he left at the end of the Reagan administration, and Bill Reilly was appointed administrator, of course, by George W. Bush, who had campaigned saying he wanted to be an environmental president. He promised to clean up Boston Harbor, which was kind of in his Maine and family backyard. So people were feeling pretty—they were not real anxious about that administration and, frankly, also, an important consideration is, into that period, there were many Republican senators especially but also Republican members of the House of Representatives, who were quite green. Environmental protection hadn't really become a partisan thing, and you had senators like Bob Stafford of Vermont; actually, Jacob Javits of New York. I'm not sure when, he may have ended before then, but John Chafee from Rhode Island; Howard Baker from Tennessee, and others—other Republicans—who were pretty positive about environmental protection, so people were not saying, “Oh, it's Republican; therefore, we're gonna have a bad time,” and here he said he wanted to be the environmental president, so the expectations of that administration, coming in, were pretty good. And Bill Reilly had very sound credentials as an environmentalist when he arrived. His deputy came from the, his deputy, Hank Habicht, was quite good. I mean, they were definitely people who were committed to the mission.
And a woman I had worked for, when I was a special assistant to Lee Thomas – had worked with, had been a special assistant to Jim Barnes, the deputy administrator who was a close confidante and colleague of Ruckelshaus's, woman from Kentucky. She came back to the agency. I guess she left, I guess, yeah, she came back to the agency and she was selected to be the assistant administrator for water, and I worked for her for most of the Reilly and George W. Bush years. And she was very committed to water quality protection and wetlands protection; she was about as green as they come. So that was a comfortable transition for me.

Although I did lose my job in the policy office. That was more a personal political thing. I had worked for Linda Fisher, who was assistant administrator for policy. She was replaced by Terry Davies from resources for the future, who was a friend and close associate of Bill Reilly's. And he, in turn, was very familiar with and very comfortable with one of my subordinates in the policy office and he wanted to promote him to be the deputy assistant administrator, which meant I needed to be somewhere else.

And it was sort of easy and logical for me to move to the water office to work for LaJuana [LaJuana Wilcher], who'd been a colleague of mine previously. We had a great relationship. And so I made a job change that I might not have made otherwise, but it was a good change, and I liked – actually, the policy office was, it was a little bit of an internal critic, a little bit of an internal OMB. It challenged what the— I mean, its role was to offer the administrator kind of a second opinion on things, and so there had been, historically, quite a bit of tension between that office and the program offices. And my heart was kind of with the program offices because I'd been in OSWER before I came to the policy office, and I thought a lot of their ideas were a little bit detached from reality. And so, while I was in that office, I tried to improve relationships between the policy office and the program offices, with minimal success, probably. But then, when I moved to the water office, although I had no real technical or scientific credentials in water quality management, I knew I would enjoy working for LaJuana.

I thought I could make a contribution there and I ended being there for the rest of my career and having 13 great years there.

So that transition from Reagan to Bush was not particularly difficult, I don't think, for anybody in the agency because we had – Reilly – the problem was that lots of people at OMB and other federal agencies didn't want George Bush to be the environmental president, so they pushed back and the agency wasn't able to be as green as Bill Reilly would have wanted to be. I mean, he tells this story about hiding from phone calls from the White House when he was at the UNEP conference in Rio, one of the early climate conferences. So I think it was a pretty good, easy transition. I know Susan really enjoyed the assistant administrator that she had during that period. And I worked – from the water office, I did work across agency lines a little bit, and I thought all
these assistant administrators were pretty solid, and the agency was really
cracking along, doing its job, and there was pretty good morale across the
agency.

INTERVIEWER: What about – I mean, so now you're in the water office as of 1989, right?
INTERVIEWEE: Right.

INTERVIEWER: Something like that. So, in terms of the use of – or your contact with science
and scientists in that time period, could you tell me –

INTERVIEWEE: Well, yeah. I mean, there – that was interesting. Of course, we had a water
quality standards program, which had a lot of biologists and toxicologists
working on it to develop what the safe levels in ambient water for fish, wildlife,
and people were, of different contaminants, different pollutants. There was
sometimes some tension between that office and the offices that relied on
water quality standards of the waste water management office and my office.
We interacted with them on water quality guidelines for ocean dumping and
for wetlands, although most people didn't apply the ambient water quality
standards to wetlands because you didn't have a lot of discharge of effluents
into wetlands. People put effluents in the larger water bodies.

But we had some back-and-forth. I don't think there was any – I know,
actually, in my assistant administrator days, my assistant administrator for
policy days, Jack Moore, who was the assistant administrator for pesticides
and toxics, headed up a science council. And it was a place to try to reconcile
differences between the air program toxicologist, water program toxicologist,
and pesticide and toxics toxicologist, about “What's the right Q star number
for this pollutant or that pollutant?” They might get different results. And there
was an effort to try to reconcile those sorts of thing. But I don't think there's –
I think sound science was one of the values that the agency was espousing.
“We're gonna make our decisions based upon sound science.” And I think
everybody kind of pledged allegiance to that principle.

INTERVIEWER: You were involved in the evolution of the wetlands issue and sort of rule-
makings and so on, in that time period?

INTERVIEWEE: Yes. I mentioned this thing that was set up for John Breaux, this national –
well, first, there was the national wetlands policy forum in Thomas's year,
which I didn't have a lot to do with, but parts of that were still being
implemented. And then we did this White House wetlands working group,
which was initiated right after the transition to Carol Browner.5

And I will say, I mean, my transition in the office of water was from LaJuana
Wilcher as AA to Bob Perciasepe as AA. And Bob had run the Maryland
Department of the Environment. He'd been a planning officer, then
environmental director for the City of Baltimore. He was a government
person. Some of the environmental groups approached him while he was
waiting for his confirmation hearings, to say, “Well, some of your people over

5 Carol Browner served as Administrator of the EPA during the Clinton administration from 1993
to 2001.
there just aren't... Of course, we've always been sued, EPA was always sued by both the environmental groups and industry, over most major decisions, and we usually weren't green enough for the environmental groups. I mean, they sort of felt, tactically, they had to be on the greener end of the spectrum from where EPA was, which was between them and where industry was. Some of them, I know, went to Bob—he told me he went to him and said, “Well, some of the people you've got here aren't really as green as they should be. Your wetlands people are, they've made decisions that we advise them against, and maybe you should think about some personnel changes there.” And he said, “Look, these people were trying to keep the program from being undone.” I mean, we were having bills introduced to turn the program back to the corps of engineers, drastically restrict the geographic reach of the Clean Water Act. I mean, there's all kinds of pushback on the program at that time. And he said, “You know, they recognized that they needed to be able to keep the program running,” and so he was a great boss to work for. He gave his—he was a good manager. He'd been in management positions. Typically, a lot of the Democratic appointees came from academia or from environmental groups, and many of them had never managed anything nearly as large as the organizations they were put in charge of at EPA, but Bob had—had really been a manager, and he kind of—he met privately with each of the office directors and deputy office directors to talk about management challenges in the office. And we told him we had a division director that we really—was not working out and we really were gonna need to make a change there. You know, he didn't need to hear any more than we thought that needed to happen. See, I was going to go back and mention another interesting contrast, but I've lost it and we're going to run short on time.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. Yeah. So you need to go. You have how much longer about?
INTERVIEWEE: Probably another 15 minutes or so. Ten minutes maybe, yeah.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Well, let's talk about—you talked a little bit about the Clinton transition.
INTERVIEWEE: I was there for the transition to George W. Bush.

INTERVIEWER: So why don't you talk a little bit about that too? Since that's another sort of Democrat to Republican, I think I'd like to hear a little more about that. And then I have some wrap-up questions about your whole—looking at your career in whole and that kind of thing.

INTERVIEWEE: Sure. Actually, that transition also was one that—I don't want to generalize about the agency as a whole and how people saw that in the air program or they saw that from other parts of the agency. There was—of course, there was a feeling that George W. Bush had been something of a disappointment. We hadn't been able to go as far as we wanted to because we had continuous pushback from OMB on everything. And things had started to become more partisan. I mean, most of the opposition, but not all of it, on wetlands, was coming from the Republican side of the aisle. We had the cabinet status fizzled out and much of that opposition was from Republicans, but not all of it, but some of that was on science issues. There had been this—there's this new secret science bill that they're talking about. Well, there
had been, during the cabinet debate, industry had prompted the then, I guess this was post the change in party for the control of the House and—

INTERVIEWER: The 1994 Contract with America?
INTERVIEWEE: Right. Right. And that had stuff where – but I think there was a plank in there about sound science, and that was really all about make scientific proof too difficult to be able to use it, sort of answer every question to the last decimal point, which you'll spend your whole career doing, rather than using any science. And I'm trying to remember the name of the – might have been Mica from Florida, but there were a couple of proposals in the House for really bad science bills, and so we had contended with those. Of course, they weren't enacted; there was not— I think we still had a Democratic-controlled Senate, but things had started to become more partisan, so there was more anxiety about the George W. Bush transition.

<T: 80 min>

He didn't say he wanted to be an environmental president and I think a lot of the opposition had started to take on a more partisan flavor.

However, the guy that was nominated to be assistant administrator for water was somebody I had worked with during the George H. W. Bush period, briefly. He had been a state environmental director. He'd been the Great Lakes director for Governor — I'm forgetting the governor's name— but, anyway, he had some pretty good credentials, and the person who was coming in as the deputy assistant. They started doing political deputy assistant administrators during the period of Bill Reilly. The political deputy who was coming in was a House congressional staffer, who I knew to be pretty green himself, although he had a lot of members that he had to serve who were not green at all, but he was a solid guy. I knew him well. So I knew both of these guys. I had a relationship with both of 'em. I like them both. They didn't come in starting to talk about moving people around, reorganizing, any of that stuff.

So I was expecting that we would kind of do business as usual, without a lot of “large-P” political interference. Unfortunately, it turned out that the assistant administrator was diagnosed with blood cancer shortly after he was confirmed, and he went on a lengthy medical leave, was away from the office, and then, when he came back to the office, he was kind of on restricted duty for a while. And the political, the career deputy assistant administrator was the acting assistant administrator for much of the time I was there. But I was—I met Christie Todd Whitman; I had some interaction with her which was pretty positive. Oh, I forgot Linda Fisher came in as the deputy administrator of the agency. She'd been my colleague in OSWER. She'd been my boss when she was DAA for policy under Bill Reilly. And I knew I wouldn't have anything to worry about. She had also been Susan's boss, my wife's boss, when she was AA for pesticides and toxics. Susan had been acting administrator. My biggest concern was Susan had been acting administrator for over three years in the pesticides and toxics office, and we
figured that, having served in that role for the Democratic administration, an incoming Republican administration would probably show her to the broom closet.

And, as it turned out, that was probably an overblown concern because she had a great relationship with Linda Fisher, so she probably could have stayed where she was or—but she had found a— and Carol Browner had promised to help her to leave the agency while staying on, while remaining a civil servant under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, so Susan actually went to the College of William and Mary to set up their Washington, D.C. office right after inauguration day. But she did that as an EPA employee for two years, which nobody wanted to interfere with. They all thought that was fine.

So that transition was not difficult for me, I would say it wasn't difficult for the office of water at all, and I think it was—I mean, the one thing that happened. And I have to say, I helped encourage this, one of the core values during the Reilly years, which I agreed with, was that many people were staying in the same programmatic silo for their entire careers. And we thought, and I fully subscribe to this, that the agency would function better if people would move from air office to water office to waste office and not just at the office director, highest levels, but down further into the organization. And you would learn things you could apply in a new office and you would have a broader range of colleagues you call on and network with, working on things.

Well, I had convinced Linda of the value of that, and that really hadn't happened much since the end of the Thomas and early Reilly era. And so things had kind of ossified again and people had been 10 or 12 years in their silos, and I said to Linda, when she was deputy administrator, “I think it'd be good to re-institute some managed reassignments.” Because people are comfortable where they are, making a change is not as easy as continuing to do what you think you can do well. And so they instituted a process of doing that and actually did move a lot of people around, and I think, for the right reasons. Although not everybody was comfortable with that. When they talked to me about where I wanted to move to, I said, “I'll be 55 in 18 months. I've loved working at EPA, but I've got some really good subordinates, and none of them is going to be able to have the joy of being the director of the office of wetlands, oceans, and watersheds if I encumber it, or, if I encumber some other senior position in another organization I'm going to block people who—I mean, the demographics of EPA were such that a whole lot of people who come in during EPA's growth years, and a lot of them were quite good and certainly able to move up organizationally but were blocked by people just a couple of years older than they were. And so I said – and they weren't going to have their chance – they were going to sort of age out in their branch chief or division director positions, without having a chance to move up – so I said, “My plan is that, when I'm eligible to retire, I'm going to do that.”

And so that allowed me to stay where I was because there wasn't much point in moving me to a new organization and be in it for 18 months or 2 years, so I had a very easy time of it in that transition and developed a good relation with Governor Whitman, had a great relationship with Tracey and with Linda and with Ben Grumbles, the deputy assistant administrator, so that was smooth.
INTERVIEWER: So that also gives me an idea about why you then retired in that administration. And so it was not that you were upset with the policies or that kind of thing.

INTERVIEWEE: No, not at all. No. And, of course, I mean, obviously, Whitman left earlier than she would have liked, I’m sure, because she was stymied and frustrated. And Linda – they told Linda she wasn’t going to move up, so she decided to move on. But, no, I didn’t have any policy disagreements with anybody. We didn’t initiate a lot of new, more aggressive stuff in the early George W. Bush era, but there wasn’t a lot of backsliding going on in those first couple of years either.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. I think what I want to do, since we’re just about out of time, is I want to maybe send you these last wrap-up questions on your sort of overall career and so on and just jump to the questions about the current administration and just your expectations about those, about what parts of the agency you think are most vulnerable, given what you’ve seen and heard thus far about the new administration and its vision for EPA. So that question and then anybody else that you think I should speak with or that you could point me to who would also give me some insight into these kinds of things we’ve been talking about.

INTERVIEWEE: Uh-huh. And I know – I’m just wondering – well, I’ll think about that and I’ll give you some answers and maybe we can talk again about that too.


INTERVIEWEE: […]

INTERVIEWER: Okay. So you wanna just go ahead and do that now and we can talk later? Is that – or I can you send you those additional questions?

INTERVIEWEE: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, why don’t you send me the additional questions, but we can talk later and I might have short answers to some of them that I can get back to you quickly with.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Okay. Well, that sounds good. All right. I really appreciate talking.

[…]

<T: 130 min>

[END OF INTERVIEW]